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ABSTRACT
This paper constructs a game theoretical model of the Soviet Union
based on Aumann-Kurz tax theory. The Shapley value is coraputed for the
party center, an atom, as well as for an ocean composed of workers and
peasants. The equation relating peasant economic power to peasant political
power is estimated for the period 1925-29. The power share of the peasants
is estimated to be 12%, as opposed to 44% for the party center.
Ever since the pathbreaking work of Bettelheim [5], scholars have taken
seriously the notion of class struggle in the U.S.S.R. The power struggle
of the 1920s makes this period unique in Soviet history. This paper consi
ders these power struggles from the standpoint of Aumann-Kurz tax theory.
Section 1 of the paper presents the model of a one-party state. The
next section discusses Aumann-Kurz tax theory in a one-party state. Section
3 invokes the solution concept for this theory, the Shapley value, and
derives the Shapley value allocations for the power and income redistribu
tion games. The final section estimates the distribution of power based on
Soviet data for the period 1925-29.
•Kir
I. The Model
1. General Structure
• The model has three types of agents - peasants, workers, and the
party - and two different goods, money income grain. The government, which
is run by the party, huys grain from peasants at the domestic market price
p. The world price of grain is the numeraire; this is the price peasants
could get for their grain had they access to the world market. Thus, all
money incomes are measured relative to the world market price of grain.
The society T equals [0,1], the unit interval. There is a continuum of
agents (0,1] and an atom at zero for the population measure y. m is the
Lebesque measure on (0,1]. The atom at zero represents the party center;
the continuum consists of peasants and workers. The income distribution y
is also continuous on (0,1].
2. Peasants
A peasant dt is represented by a utility function u^(x(t)) = x(t),
where x(t) dt is the money value of dt's final allocation, and an endowment
y(t) of money income, which represents the world market value of the
peasant's grain. The utility function expresses risk-neutrality; the model
can be extended to encompass substantial amounts of risk aversion (see [7]).
The distinction between rich, middle, and poor peasants is expressed by
differing levels of y(t).
m
Let P be the set of peasants, PC [0,1]. We assume
0 < y(P) < 1.
Aggregate endowed peasant income, y(P), satisfies
0 < y(P) = /py(t)dy.
' K '
3. Workers
Aworker-dt is represented by the utility function u^(x(t)) = x(t), and
the endowment y(t).
Let W be the entire set of workers. Then WUP = (0,1]. One has
0 < g(W) < 1, and p(W) + y(P) =1.
For both peasants and workers, production has already taken place; the
remaining economic function is purely distributive,
4, The Party
The party consists of a center (the Central Committee or, more
narrowly, the Politburo) and a periphery, the party membership.
The party center is.represented by the point 0 and is normalized to
have weight m({0}) = 1. The party center has income endowment y({0}) = 0.
The party membership consists of workers and peasants and is represented by
the party membership measure v. The measure v is defined as follows for S
measurable:
+ (1-6) for 9 e (0,1).
In particular, v(W) = 9, v(P) = 1-6, and v(W U P) = 1.
Control of the party means control of the state. A coalition which can
exercise control of the party is winning. A winning coalition must include-
the party center, and a proportion a of the membership,
0 < a < 1.
The extreme values a = 0 and a = 1 represent dictatorship of the party
center and unanimity rule respectively. The complement of a winning coali
tion is losing. A coalition which is neither winning nor losing is indeci
sive. Example^ of indecisive coalitions are {0} and P VJ W.
The party center plays the role of a veto player: it never belongs to a
losing coalition.
The state is the chief purchaser of the grain, which it resells to
workers and exports to the rest of the world. Peasants pay taxes out of
their grain sale receipts; state purchases are financed by the taxes it
collects. The determination of the after-tax income distribution and tax
functions is the subject of the next two sections.
II. Game Theory and Power Struggle
In the Aumann-Kurz model of distribution [1,2], the major aspect of the
state is its tax policy. The state has unlimited tax powers; it can
expropriate whom it pleases. On the other hand, those subject to expropria
tion can destroy their endowments and thus deprive their expropriators of
their loot. In a cooperative game, the tax system which emerges has somehow
to weigh the threats to expropriate and to escape expropriation in an
overall compromise.
A cooperative game (T,v) is a pair consisting of the set of players T
and coalition function v, which measures what each coalition can assure its
members. There are cooperative games on two levels in the present model:
the purely political struggle for power, and the economic struggle over the
distribution of income.
The struggle for power is the easiest to describe. For S d T) the
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coalition function v^ is given by
r1 if S is winning
Vi(S)=j
(O otherwise.
A coalition has the full state power if it is wining, and not otherwise.
This may seem to undervalue an indecisive coalition. One can also consider
the game dual to v^, v|, defined by v^(S) = ~ dual power
struggle game is given by
C" 1 if S is not losing
Co otherwise.
Both these representations of the power struggle vd.ll prove useful.
'f(S) =
The cooperative game concerning the distribution of income v^^ is a
more complicated affair. Clearly, for the grand coalition T, v^^CT) = y(T).
Again, if S is indecisive, so is its countercoalition T/S. In this case,
the members of S can assure themselves of their own income and =
y(S). Now suppose S is winning and T/S is losing. If S and T/S carry out
their strongest threats, then S expropriates T/S and T/S destroys its entire
endowment. This yields an outcome to S and T/S of (y(S),0), respectively.
Consider this outcome as the disagreement point of the Nash bargaining
problem for dividing y(T) between S and T/S. The solution of the Nash
bargaining problem is
for S, 1/2 [y(T) + y(S)].
for T/S, 1/2 [y(T) - y(S)].
These are taken to be the coalition function values for S and T/S
respectively.
To summarize, for the income redistribution game, the coalition
function v^^ satisfies
1/2 [y(T) + y(S)J if S is wining "
Vij(S) = y(S) if S in indecisive
1/2 [y(T) - y(T/S)] if S is losing
It is also convenient to introduce a related cooperative game defined
by q(S)
y(S) if S is not losing
q(S) =
0 otherwise.
The relationship between and q is that
v^^(S) = 1/2 [q(S) + qf/CS)].
It is important to stress that in the cooperative game, threats to
expropriate or to destroy endowments are not actually carried out in the
final compromise. The situation would degenerate into noncooperative
behavior if such were the case. One reason to opt for a cooperative over a
noncooperative model is the fact that such threats are not carried out.
III. Power Distribution and Income Distribution
A widely accepted measure of political and economic power in a coopera
tive game is the Shapley value <^, The Shapley value has'been given an
axiomatic foundation; in particular, it satisfies axioms of linearity,
symmetry, and Pareto efficiency [3, Appendix A]. The Shapley value also
satisfies the random order interpretation: the Shapley value of a player t
in a game v is the expected marginal product of that player in a random
ordering of all players. Formally,
(|)v(t) =E[v(S^) - v(S^/{t})]
where is the set of players up to and including t in a random order R on
the set of players, and E is the expectations operator when all random
m
orders on T are equally likely.
The Shapley value was originally defined for games with a finite number
of players. For the present situation, which has one large player and a
continuum of small players, Neyman has shown that there is an extension of
the Shapley value which continues to satisfy the symmetry and efficiency
axioms, and the random order interpretation [11, Theorem A],
We now turn to the Shapley value for the political power and income
distribution games.
Proposition 1. The Shapley value of the power distribution game v^
satisfies.
<t>v^({0}) = 1-a
ijiv^(P) = ae
.^jv^(W) = a(l-9)
Proof: By Shapiro and Shapley [14, Theorem A], the value of the atom in the
ce-quota game is 1-a. By the results of Hart [8, Theorem A] and Neyman [11,
Lewin 6], the power of a condition SC. WUP is proportional to its voting
size. Since v(W U P) = 1» the proportionality constant is a. Then,
= av(S), for SCWlJP.
It then follows that
ifViCW) = a0
and
= a(l-0).
Under the assumption of equal likelihood of party membership, these
Shapley values are uniformly spread over P and W respectively. An increase
in a, the quota needed to form a winning coalition, increases the power of
both workers and peasants and decreases that of the party center. On the
other hand, a decrease in a centralizes power. Further, an increase in a
class's party representation increases'its power. Finally, we note that for
any game v, (J)v = (J)v#, by reversing random orders. Thus, the power
distribution of proposition 1 also holds for the dual power game v|.
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We now turn to the income distribution implied by the Shapley value of
the income redistribution game. This income distribution is intimately
connected with the distribution of power.
Proposition 2. The Shapley value 4" for the income distribution game v^^ is
given by
4wj.j({0}) = ((l-ci)^/2)y(T)
2
ctiViiCW) =^±^y(W) + a(l-a)ey(T)
2
4Wil(P) =^^y(P) + a(l-a)(l-6)y(T).
Proof. See Appendix 1.
One can look at the effect of power on the distribution of income by
sector in two ways. The first is with respect to price. Peasants realize
their Shapley value income by grain sales on the domestic market at price
P.
py(P) = "Jiv^^CP),
Since the world market price of grain is the numeraire, p represents the
relative price of domestically traded grain. This price is quite sensitive
to the distribution of power, as shown in the following corollary to
Proposition 2:
Corollary. If the peasant share in the initial distribution of income
exceeds their relative share of power, then p < 1.
y(T)
Proof. Denote by Y = reciprocal of the peasant share of income.
From proposition 2 and the definition of p,
11
2
p =-2~ a(l-o)(l-0)Y
By hypothesis
. (y)~^ > (1-0),
which implies
y(I-0) <1.
Hence,
2 2
^ 1+a , ^ l + 2a-CfP <—— + a(1- a) 2 < 1•
One can also predict the effects on price of changes in the parameters
of the distribution of power. First,
jsp
— =? -a(l-a)Y < 0
An increase in worker representation in the party decreases the price paid
to peasants for grain. The effect of decentralization on price is given by
"1^ = a + (1-0 )y(1-2 a)
0 Ot
If the peasant share in income is less than their relative share in power,
then
(1-0)y < 1, and
1^ >a + (l-2a) =1-a >0,
decentralization raises the price paid to peasants. However, when peasant
share in income is greater than their share in power", decentralization may
lower the price paid to them for grain,, Finally, an increase in Y raises
the price p:
= a(l-a)(l-0) > 0.
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If the economy as a whole grows faster than the peasant sector, p should
rise.
Alternatively, one can measure the effect of the parameters of power on
the distribution of income through its effect on quantities. Define the
collection (subsidy) rate e(P) to be
y(P) - 4iv (P)
= TCP) •
This represents the proportion of their grain that peasants give up (or
receive from) the redistribution process. The relation between Che price
and quantity measures is simply
e(?) = 1 - p.
When p is less than 1, then e(P) represents a collection rate. The same
forces which drive the price down drive the collection rate up. Thus, the
collection rate increases when peasant representation in the party
diminishes, if the degree of centralization and the income share remain
constant.
IV, Application to the USSR, 1925-29
This section estimates the e(P) equation for Soviet data of the period
1925-29. The data and their sources are described in Appendix 2. Before
discussing the estimation results, some general discussion of the applica
bility of the model to this period is in order.
The most crucial issue in any application of Aumann-Kurz taxes is that
of strategic fit. The state threat to expropriate grain and the peasant
threat to sabotage agricultural production must be clearly present. The
Soviet government called a halt to grain requisition without compensation in
1921. Considerable propaganda effort during the 1920s went into convincing
13
the peasants that such reculsitlcns would not resume. The extent of these
Cs shows just how real the state threat remained. Again, the "excep
tional measures" of 1928-29. which entailed requisition of grain at the
state price p, were supposed to be just that, exceptional.
e peasant side, it is crucial that the peasantry retain control of
agricultural production. As late as 1927 97 3% of .u
y/.JA or the sown area of the
»ss. ... b,
'..v., .tia, 1...
By the ead of 1933 , 64.42 of the crop area coUectivi.ed [12. p. 174]
-.0. the o, ooopotatlv. „ th.ot,. the eon.ot..,„t.oo
the Of th. oo.pto.,.e het.eo. the .t.te .he p.....„
the 1920., „ .o.„op.„„.e „l.t.o... „e .tat. oot
to . 1„„ e„eht e.p„p„.,fon threat M„ ^
per.od 1910-33 uij.j,
..b..a,e threat. «n of thf. pof.t. to ar...o..„i, ..o. .trat.sfo ffr for
Aumann Kurz taxes in the period 1925-29.
...the, oroofal „ .he tr..t„p. the part, o..,.r aa a. ato..
-terpret... .h.
TKe <,f.,..o.. f. .he ,„n,horo after Uaf.., ^.h 1,24, .„hoUa.i
antagonist between Bukharin, Stalin, and Trotsky, are extremely important,
ndeed, it is only after the expulsion of the Trotsky and Bukharin factions
(t elatter at the end of 1929). that the collectivization drive begins.
Assu..ng that ais constant during the period 1925-29 co^its one to the
Proposition that the overall power of the Politburo is independent of the.
struggles. This last proposition can hardly be confirmed.
^®^^ted issue i^ t'h'st-that of exogeneity. Part nfo y. rart ot the movement in 0 wasue to Party policy; for instance, the Lenin recruitment drives of 1924-25.
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To the extent that the party center was able to manipulate 6, estimates of a
will not fully capture the power of the party center. The same issue arises
with- the variable y, which the party center was able to influence through
its investment policy. Finally, there is a possible feedback relation from
e(P) to 0, as the economic squeeze itself forces peasants out of the party.
If such were the case, estimates of peasant power would be biased upwards.
All this suggests great caution in using the estimates of the e(P) equa-
\
tion.
Estimating the equation
e(P) = - o(l-a)(l-6)-r
by the SAS NLIN procedure, one has the following results:
a = ,563
est
asymptotic standard error = .035
• asymptotic 95% confidence interval = (.A65, ,661)
Regression sum of squares = .128
Residual sum of squares = .005.
Estimation converged after three iterations; the residual sum of squares are
plotted in Figure 1. The minimum sura of squares is quite pronounced at a =
,563.
On the basis of this result, we estimate the distribution of power at
the end of 1929 as the following:
Party Center = .A37
Workers = .441
Peasants - .122
Although inferring even a single parameter from five observations is a
chancy affair, these results do shed some light on the ideological inter-
15
Figure 1. Sum of Squared Residuals
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pretation of events of this period. First, the estimate of party center
power, about 44%, shows just how much was at stake in the struggle between
Stalin and his rivals. A single individual taking charge of the party cen
ter would be as powerful as the entire working class. Since the estimate of
a is if anything biased downwards, it seeras hardly a large step from "dicta
torship of the proletariat" to "dictator over the proletariet." Again,
given that peasants were 80% of the working population^ their power share of
12% shows just how little represented they were in the power structure and
how vulnerable they were to something like a forced collectivization drive.
The workers here appear as a class caught in the middle, not necessarily
standing to gain from tha collectivization of the peasant class and concomi
tant state conquest of peasant power^ From the standpoint of subsequent
Soviet history, the period from 1929 onward appears to have been one of
increasing centralization of power in the hands of Stalin himself.
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Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 2
By linearity of the Shapley value,
d) = 1/2 [6 +<{>#]. Since <ii = <{> it suffices to compute ^ .
q q
It follows from Neyman [10] that q has an assumptotic value. Since all
limiting values converge to the asymptotic value, it suffices to compute a
single limit.
Define q and q by
q(s) = y(S U W) if S is not losing
0 otherwise
q(S) = y(S U P) if S is not losing
0 otherwise
Clearly, q(S) - q(S) + q(S). We shall compute ^iq; a similar argument
establishes 4^*
Let (II, } be a decreasing and separating sequence of partitions of
W P, In particular, at each stage k,
w = U w..
i=i "
2^
p = U P..
• i=l ^
with p(W^) =2^u(W) for all i (likewise, y(P^). Also, E[y(W^)] =2^y(W),
Let B., B«, ... B , , be a random ordering of the W., P., and {0}.
'2 +1 ^ ^
We compute the expected marginal contribution of {0}.
k+1 -1
With probability (2 +1) , {0} is first in a random order, in which
case his marginal contribution is 0. With probability (2 + 1) , {0} is
1.8
second in a random ordering, in which case his marginal contribution is
E[y(W^)] with conditional probability 1/2 and 0 with conditional probability
k+1 -1
r/2. With probability (2 +1) , {0} is third in a random ordering, in
which case his marginal contribution is 2E[y(W^)] with conditional
probability 1/4, E[y(W^)] with conditional probability 1/2, and 0 with
conditional probability 1/4, and so on.
Let r x"] denote the greatest integer less than or equal to x. Once
... B^) - m({0}) >Fc l-a)2^"'"^ , {0}*s marginal contribution is
0. Then, {0}'s expected marginal contribution is
2"'^+l
1 < h <
= 2'N(w)
2 +1
k+1'1^ h^ ["(1-0)2
= y(W)
.2 „2k+2 ^ ,-k+l
(1- g) 2 + (l-a)2
22k+3 ^ 2^+2
In the limit as k -»• », one has
q 2
At each stage k, one has
and
ey(W.)
(1-9) m(P )
^(Pr^= 2-\l-0).
+ o(k).
We now seek the expected marginal contribution of in the game at stage k.
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The only' time makes a positive marginal contribution is when is
pivotal, that is when U B^ U is not losing and U B^ ,..U
B is losing. For P. to be pivotal, B- ... Ub and (1-a) -
n 1 • 1 z n
< v(BjU < (1-a).
From the limiting argument underlying Proposition 1, the probability of
-ksuch an event is a2 (1-0) + o(k), for k large enough.
From the binomial distribution, the expected value of y(Bj^ LJ B^ ...
Bh) is
ElCyCB^UB^U ... Bj^)] =|y(W.).
=I 2"''y(W).
By the central limit theorem, for k large enough.
If 4-1
h = (l-a)2 + o(k).
Hence, the expected marginal contribution of P^ at stage k is
a2"''(l-e)y(H)(l-a) + o(k).
Summing over the i, and taking the limit as k
(t^(P) = a(l-e)(l-a)y(W)
By efficiency
«h(W) = y(W) - 4)-({0}) -
q q
implies
^(W) = 1+a + a0(l-a) y(w).
A similar argument for q leads to
<!>=( {0}), = y(P)
4.(P) = + a(l-0)(l-a)
4^(W) = a0(l-a)y(P).
y(P)
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Finally, by linearity of the Shapley value, * '^q ~ Since y(W) +
y(P) = y(T), one has
.(.^({O}) = y(.T)
2
<|.q(P) =^^y(P) +a(l-e)(l-a)y(T)
2
4.^(w) = y(W) + a9(l-a)y(T).
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Appendix 2, Data
The following data are used in the estimation of the model:
year e(P) ^ _Y
1925 .123 ,735 ' 2,73
1926 .152 .7A1 2.86
1927 .153 .727 3.06
1928 .147 .771 3.03
1929 .224 .783 3.22
The e(P) series from Karcz [10, Table 2] and Nove [12, p. 180 and 186],
is the ratio of state grain procurement to the total grain harvest. The
average for the years 1925-29 is 16.0%. During the collectivization period
of 1930-33, e(P) was .265, .328, .266, and .330 respectively, for an average
collection rate of 29.7%, Collectivization nearly doubled the collection
rate. In contrast to a rising e(P) during 1925-29, one observes sharply
falling p [12, p. 157], The ratio of official to private prices falls from
.91 in December 1926 to .44 by June 1929.
The 0 series is constructed from Rigby [13, p. 116], Following Soviet
sources, Kigby divides the data into three classes - workers, peasants, and
employees. The 0 series aggregates the worker and employee figures.
The Y series is the ratio of GNP to value of agricultural production.
This constructed from the Soviet input-output table of 1924, the Johnson-
Kahan index of agricultural production [9] and the GNP data in Bergson [4],
All these series rest ultimately on Soviet data. To the extent that'
the Soviet data is itself unreliable, the precision of these series cannot
be vouchsafed. As Rigby says of the 9 series, "While the precision of these
22
percentages should not be exaggerated, being distorted not only by error and
misinformation, but also by changes of classification, as we shall see
below, they appear to be accurate enough to give a reliable impression of
general trends." Indeed, the overall trends of rising e(P), rising 0, and
rising Y are generally accepted. Th^ ultimate meaning of any Soviet data is
that it is collected for and used by the party leaders.
23
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